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Endogenous Social Discount Rate,
Proportional Carbon Tax, and Sustainability

Abstract
Whether discounting the utility of future generations can pose a very serious
problem in that future generations will never possess the opportunity to express
their preference concerning the current resource allocation, which will ultimately
aﬀect their utility.
In this paper, we tackle the abovementioned problem in the context of global
warming, which is crucially connected with the emission and accumulation of
CO2 . We analyze how the social optimum is attained under the constraint
of sustainability proposed by Pezzey (1997). We ﬁnd the following relationship
between the optimal policies: the condition that utility should not be discounted
attains the optimal allocation in social planning. And it corresponds to adopting
the socially optimal carbon tax rate in a decentralized economy.
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Introduction

Evaluating the utility of future generations is a diﬃcult problem because the
future generations cannot be held responsible for their ancestors’ behavior. In
other words, the economic activity of the current generation aﬀects the voiceless
future generations. A prominent example of this problem is global warming,
which is inseparable from the emission and accumulation of CO2 .
Much research in resource and environmental economics discounts the utility
of future generations a priori1 . However, such discounting has no solid logical
foundation. Therefore, the main purpose of this article is to endogenously determine the optimal discount rate for the CO2 emission/accumulation problem
under the constraint of sustainability.
This article uses a utilitarian-egalitarian deﬁnition of sustainability proposed
by Pezzey (1997). That is, we call an economy sustainable when each generation
can enjoy the same utility level2 .
We will determine the optimal social discount rate in the following steps:
First, on the basis of the abovementioned deﬁnition of sustainability, we calculate the optimal tax that is proportionate to the emission of CO2 . For simplicity,
we assume that the present generation is not concerned with the utility of the
generations after it, and only a part of the CO2 emission is mainly absorbed
by oceans. Thus, the new emission is partly and excessively accumulated in the
future. To avoid excess emission through the price mechanism, the proportional
carbon tax is desirable because the tax can fully reﬂect the true price of CO2 .
In other words, when higher tax is incurred owing to the emission of CO2 , individuals begin to reduce the levels of their emission; consequently, this tax policy
will lessen the amount of CO2 that is carried over to the future generations.
Second, we solve the social planning problem that attains the same utility
level as the one achieved under the optimal proportional carbon tax. This
procedure, called the method of Negishi (1960), reveals how the optimal carbon
tax rate and endogenously determined social discount rate are correlated.
We ﬁnd that conventional discounting in social planning cannot achieve optimal taxation in a market economy and that if each generation is certiﬁed to
enjoy the same utility, its utility should be weighed equal.
It is noteworthy that utility discounting is compatible with our utilitarian1 For
2 We

example, Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Hartwick (1977), and Solow (1986)
use the term “utilitarian-egalitarian” in the following sense. Utilitarian means that we

measure individuals’ welfare not solely by consumption level or that of CO2 but their utility
as a whole. Egalitarian implies that every generation should be certiﬁed to experience equal
utility.
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egalitarian deﬁnition of sustainability. Whenever the economy applies a positive
discount rate, it implies that every generation prefers more consumption to the
amenity acquired from the reduction of CO2 emission. As such, even in the
stationary state, where each generation attains the same utility and hence the
egalitarian principle holds, the economy does not necessarily reach the ﬁrst-best
resource allocation. Thus, the quest for the optimal social discount rate is not
self-evident even from the utilitarian-egalitarian view of sustainability.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we construct a model wherein
the consumption/emission decision is decentralized across generations. In Section 3, we analyze the properties of the model in the stationary state and calculate the optimal carbon tax rate in a market economy and the optimal weight of
each generation in the additive separable social welfare function for a planning
economy. Section 4 contains our brief concluding remarks.

2

Model

2.1

The dynamics of CO2

We assume that the dynamics of CO2 accumulation are as follows:
et = αet−1 + ct ,

0 < α < 1,

(1)

where et is the stock of CO2 during period t, measured by its weight; ct is the
current consumption; and α denotes the remaining ratio of CO2 per period. We
further assume that unit production/consumption emits unit weight of CO2 .
This assumption is permitted by deﬁning the unit of production/consumption
volume such that it corresponds to the unit weight emission of CO2 .
The meaning of diﬀerence equation (1) is as follows. The current total CO2
stock et consists of two parts. One part is the accumulated stock of CO2 that
is carried over from the previous period αet−1 . The other is the emission by
the current period consumption ct . Thus, the dimension of equation (1) is the
weight of CO2 .
Takahashi et al.(1980) and Ramanathan et al.(1985) estimate that the ratio of CO2 absorbed by the surface of the ocean is about 0.5%-5% per year.
Accordingly, it is plausible that some existing CO2 stock is absorbed by oceans.

2
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2.2

Individuals

Individuals live for one period and their identical concave utility function Ut is
∂u
∂u
> 0,
< 0,
∂ct
∂et
∂2u ∂2u 2
∂ 2 u ∂u ∂u
∂2u ∂2u
( 2) −2
+ 2 ( 2 )2 > 0.
2
∂ct ∂et
∂ct ∂et ∂et ∂ct
∂et ∂ct

Ut ≡ u(ct , et ),

(2)

Individuals’ feasibility constraint is
et = αet−1 + [1 + θ]ct − τt ,

(3)

where θ denotes the proportional carbon tax rate, and τt is the transfer from
the government.
The meaning of (3) is that when the proportional carbon tax is introduced,
for unit consumption, individuals need a good 1 + θ unit, which emits CO2 that
amounts to 1 + θ. The transfer from the government economizes the production
and mitigates the emission. This is why τt possesses the negative sign on the
right-hand side of (3).

2.3

The government

The government transfers the collected tax to individuals equally3 . Then, the
government’s budget constraint is
θct = τt .

3

(4)

Market economy and social planning

In this section, we ﬁrst calculate the optimal carbon tax rate in the stationary
market economy. Second, we consider the optimal social planning for CO2
emission, which has the same eﬀect as the optimal proportional carbon tax.
On the basis of these considerations, we shall be able to determine whether the
utilities of future generations should be discounted.

3.1

Optimal tax rate in the stationary market economy

In a market economy, each individual maximizes her/his utility (2) subject to
the feasibility constraint (3). Hence, the following ﬁrst-order condition should
3 Note

that although individuals know the values of θ and τ , they do not consider the gov-

ernment’s budget constraint relationship in their decision-making processes. Such assumption
never contradicts with their rational economic behavior.
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hold:
1 ∂u
∂u
+
= 0,
1 + θ ∂ct
∂et

∀ t.

(5)

The dynamics of the market economy are described completely, using two difference equations: (1) and (5).
For simplicity, we assume that the economy is initially located in some stationary state (c∗ , e∗ ). Then, it is evident from Figure 1 that the optimal tax
α
rate θ∗ in the stationary state E ∗ is
.
1−α

3.2

Optimal social planning and utility discounting

We now focus on the social planning problem under the utilitarian-egalitarian
deﬁnition of sustainability4 . We now present the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1 An economy is sustainable iﬀ
u(ct , et ) ≥ U ,

∀t

(6)

holds for some given U .
This deﬁnition gives us the following maximization problem of the government:
max

{ct ,et }T
t=0

u(c0 , e0 ),

∀ t.

(7)

]
[
λt u(et − αet−1 , et ) − U .

(8)

s.t. e−1 = e,

u(ct , et ) ≥ U

The corresponding Lagrangian L is
L ≡ u(e0 − αe−1 , e0 ) +

T
∑
t=1

The ﬁrst-order condition yields
[ ∂u
∂u ]
∂u
λt
+
− αλt+1
= 0.
∂ct
∂et
∂ct+1

(9)

An important property of the stationary state emerges in (9). The stream
{ }T
of Lagrangian multipliers, λ∗t
, satisﬁes the following diﬀerence equation:
t=1

[
λ∗t

∂u ]
]
[
∗
∂e
= αλ∗t+1
1− −
∂u
∂c∗

4 This

⇔

λ∗t+1

∂u ]
[
]
[
∗
1
∂e
=
· λ∗t ,
1− −
∂u
α
∂c∗

λ∗0 = 1, (10)

deﬁnition of sustainability is identical to that in Pezzey (1997), although we do not

consider some contradiction between sustainability and “optimality.”
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∂u
∗
∂e
where (c , e ) is a stationary state of Equation (1), and −
is the marginal
∂u
∂c∗
substitution rate between consumption and the stock of CO2 in the stationary
∗

∗

state.
Using the method of Negishi (1960), we can easily prove that the maximal
problem (8) with the initial condition, e−1 = e∗ , is equivalent to the maximization of the following social welfare function:
max
et

T
∑

λ∗t u(et − αet−1 , et ),

e−1 = e∗ .

(11)

t=0

It is clear from (10) that utility discounting is permitted only when
∂u
∗
1
∂e
<−
.
1−α=
∂u
1 + θ∗
∂c∗
Whenever the same allocation is also attained by a market economy, (5) should
hold. Consequently, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for permitting discounting programming is
θ∗ > θ,

(12)

where θ is the existing carbon tax rate.
Such a steady state is illustrated by point ES in Figure 1. The existence of
the point such as ES implies that utility-discounting social programming yields
excess emission of CO2 even from the utilitarian-egalitarian viewpoint. To sum
up the discussion, we present the following theorem:
Theorem 1 As long as the economy is sustainable, the weight of each generation’s utility in the social welfare function should be allotted equally. Utility
discounting results in the eﬀective carbon tax rate being lower than the optimal
rate.
Finally, we discuss a case wherein the time horizon for planning is inﬁnite.
1
Theorem 1 shows that equal weight is not conﬁned to unity. As such, we set
T
for the weight and take the limit T → +∞. The correct social welfare function
for the inﬁnite horizon case is as follows:
T
1∑
u(ct , et ).
T →+∞ T
t=0

lim

(13)

Thus, the divergence problem for the sum of utility throughout generations can
be avoided even if the social discount rate is unity.
5
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4

Concluding Remarks

This paper analyzed the theoretical relationship between the social discount rate
in a planning economy and the tax rate of CO2 emission in a market economy. If
the social planner discounts the utility of the future generations, this corresponds
to a lowering of the carbon tax rate below the optimum in a market economy.
According to the utilitarian-egalitarian viewpoint of sustainability, it is desirable
to pay the correct price of CO2 , which is
α + α2 + · · · =

α
.
1−α

This also implies that in the centralized economy, the planner should not discount the utility of any generation.
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e∗
ES

u(c∗ , e∗ ) = U 1

u(c∗ , e∗ ) = U
1+θ

E∗

1
1−α

O
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